Can the Visegrad Four hold its line over Brexit: or will the splits show? by Brusenbauch Meislová, Monika
Can	the	Visegrad	Four	hold	its	line	over	Brexit	–	or
will	the	splits	show?
For	the	Visegrad	Four	(Poland,	Hungary,	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia),	Brexit	could	be	an
opportunity	to	press	for	their	own	interests	in	Europe,	not	least	because	of	the	number	of	their
citizens	who	are	living	in	Britain.	But	the	Group	is	far	from	united,	their	public	statements	about
Brexit	have	been	few	and	the	current	uproar	over	judicial	reforms	in	Poland	has	exposed	some
of	the	faultlines	in	the	alliance,	writes	Monika	Brusenbauch	Meislová.
	
The	Visegrad	Group	(also	known	as	the	Visegrad	Four	or	V4)	–	a	platform	of	four	Central	and	Eastern	European
states	(the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Poland	and	Slovakia)	established	in	1991	to	enhance	mutual	cooperation
and	coordination	–	could	play	a	major	role	in	shaping	Brexit.	The	ensuing	political	and	economic	changes	provide
an	opportunity	for	the	Visegrad	Four	to	punch	above	its	weight,	better	secure	its	interests	and	shape	the	debate
on	the	future	direction	of	the	EU.
As	Die	Welt	put	it	after	the	referendum:	“Perhaps	the	time	of	the	Eastern	European	countries	has	arrived.”	So
how	has	the	Visegrad	Group	contributed	to	the	Brexit	process	so	far?
One	V4-	and	Brexit-related	affair	made	headlines	across	the	EU	during	the	Bratislava	summit	in	September	2016,
the	first	without	the	UK.	The	Slovakian	Prime	Minister	Robert	Fico	announced	the	Visegrad	Group	countries	were
prepared	to	effectively	veto	any	Brexit	accord	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	that	would	restrict	their	citizens’	rights
to	live	and	work	in	the	UK.	He	asserted	that	since	V4	citizens	made	up	much	of	the	EU	migrant	population	in
Britain,	they	would	not	let	those	people	become	“second	class	citizens”.	Believing	that	Britain	knew	that,	for	the
V4,	this	was	an	issue	with	no	room	for	compromise,	he	declared	that	the	Visegrad	Group	would	be
uncompromising	in	the	forthcoming	Brexit	negotiations.
A	demonstration	outside	the	Polish	parliament	in	Warsaw	against	laws	undermining	judicial
independence,	July	2017.	Photo:	Grzegorz	Żukowski	via	a	CC-BY	NC	2.0	licence
The	Czech	ambassador	to	the	UK,	Libor	Sečka,	later	pointed	out	this	was	not	an	“official	statement”	of	the
Visegrad	countries’	common	position	on	their	approach	to	Brexit	negotiations.	So	what	is	the	Visegrad	Group’s
official	position?
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The	Visegrad	Group’s	official	website	is	not	particularly	helpful.	Only	one	official	statement	has	been	made	about
the	UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU.	Five	days	after	the	British	referendum,	the	V4	jointly	declared	that	whilst
respecting	UK’s	sovereign	decision,	they	deeply	regretted	that	it	had	chosen	not	to	remain	a	member.	The
countries	urged	the	focus	of	the	upcoming	negotiations	to	be	on	protecting	EU	interests	and	for	the	EU-UK
arrangement	to	be	based	on	reciprocity	and	fairness.	The	attention	was	to	be	focused	on	a	smooth	secession
process	and	a	new	cooperation	agreement	with	the	UK	as	well	as	the	EU	reform	agenda.	They	argued	the	EU
should	get	back	to	basics:
“upholding	the	fundamental	principles	upon	which	the	European	projects	has	been	founded,	using	the
full	and	genuine	potential	of	the	Four	Freedoms,	achieving	the	still	incomplete	single	market.	Instead
of	endless	theoretical	debates	on	‘more	Europe’	or	‘less	Europe’	we	need	to	focus	on	‘better	Europe’.
The	Union	should	focus	on	practical	restart	of	convergence”.
Apart	from	this,	we	have	only	one	other	joint	statement	entitled	“Strong	Europe	–	Union	of	Action	and	Trust:	Input
to	Rome	Declaration	2017”	published	in	March,	to	go	on,	which	says	very	little.
A	couple	of	V4	joint	statements	related	to	Brexit	can	be	found	on	the	Czech	government	website.	In	the	first	one,
issued	in	July	2016,	the	V4	Prime	Ministers	agreed	on	the	indivisibility	of	the	four	EU	freedoms	as	a	key	priority.
Two	months	later,	in	September	2016,	the	group	jointly	declared	that	the	“undesired”	outcome	of	the	referendum
was	nonetheless	“an	opportunity	to	improve	the	functioning	of	the	EU.”	The	countries	also	identified	five	priority
areas	where	their	citizens	expected	them	to	deliver:	strengthening	democratic	legitimacy,	value	of	diversity,
security,	migration	and	the	single	market.	Since	then,	however,	it	has	been	rather	quiet	on	the	V4	front	regarding
Brexit.
So	far	the	V4	have	been	able	to	reach	only	a	minimal	consensus	when	it	comes	to	their	position	vis-á-vis	Brexit.	It
is	the	indivisibility	of	four	EU	fundamental	freedoms	and	protection	of	their	citizens	living,	working	and	studying	in
the	UK	that	seems	to	be	the	central	priority	they	agree	upon.	Otherwise,	their	Brexit	strategy	and	reform
proposals	for	post-Brexit	EU	tend	to	be	rather	general	and	ambiguous.	Indeed,	their	broadly-defined	and	vaguely
worded	“back	to	basics”	approach	could	have	been	drafted	by	any	EU	member	state	or	grouping.	The	Visegrad
Group	seems	to	be	struggling	to	establish	a	coherent	common	position	and	act	as	a	consistent	coalition	in	Brexit
negotiations.
Three	factors	help	explain	why.	First	of	all,	the	V4	might	be	trying	not	to	show	their	hand	too	early	in	negotiations,
as	it	could	worsen	their	bargaining	position.
Secondly,	EU	member	states	negotiate	with	the	UK	on	the	basis	of	a	single	negotiating	mandate,	unanimously
agreed	on	by	the	EU27.		Underscoring	that	EU27	unity	is	absolutely	essential	in	securing	the	best	Brexit	deal
possible,	this	mandate	forms	the	basis	of	the	EU’s	approach	to	the	exit	talks.	Sporadic	deviations	from	the	official
line	notwithstanding,	the	V4	–	just	like	other	EU	member	states	–	back	the	EU’s	approach	to	the	Brexit
negotiations.
At	the	same	time,	the	V4	have	often	deviated	strongly	from	the	EU’s	official	line.	Their	approach	to	the	migrant
crisis	is	a	case	in	point,	and	has	just	elicited	much	tension	between	the	Visegrad	Group	and	the	newly-elected
French	President	Emmanuel	Macron.	A	few	days	before	the	EU	summit	at	the	end	of	June,	Macron	criticized	the
V4	for	defying	Europe’s	principles	and	values	by	rejecting	the	European	Commission’s	migrant	quotas.	He
reminded	them	that	the	EU	was	not	only	about	funds	but	was	“a	community	of	values”	and	they	could	not	treat
the	alliance	as	“a	supermarket”.	(In	a	very	similar	vein,	a	few	days	ago	the	Italian	Prime	Minister	Paolo	Gentiloni
responded	to	the	V4’s	letter	on	migration	policy	by	urging	the	V4	to	stop	“giving	dubious	lessons”.)
This	generated	a	rather	angry	response	from	the	V4	leaders	who	more	or	less	unanimously	defended	their	stance
towards	the	bloc’s	migrant-sharing	plan,	accusing	Macron	of	flaunting	his	prejudice	against	Central	European
states.	Although	Macron	asserts	that	he	does	not	want	to	deepen	the	West/East	divide	within	the	EU,	the	V4
seem	to	be	interpreting	his	approach	so	far	as	doing	just	that.
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Thirdly,	and	most	importantly,	the	Visegrad	Four	have	been	fighting	to	settle	their	internal	differences.	Fico’s
statements	about	the	Brexit	accord	veto	point	to	some	serious	internal	communication	failings.	With	often
diverging	interests,	V4’s	members	differ	significantly	in	their	approach	to	individual	EU	member	states,	EU
institutions	and	even	the	European	integration	project	as	such.	Poland	and	Hungary	have	been	moving	in	an
increasingly	different	direction	from	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia,	fuelling	debate	about	the	group’s	two-plus-
two	format.
The	contentious	judicial	reforms	in	Poland	are	a	recent	example.	In	the	early	hours	of	Saturday	morning,	a
Supreme	Court	bill	was	passed	by	the	Polish	National	Assembly	that	–	if	signed	by	President	Andrzej	Duda	–
would	have	replaced	Polish	Supreme	Court	judges	with	appointees	selected	by	the	president,	thus	effectively
paving	the	way	for	government	control	of	the	Supreme	Court.	The	European	Commission	First	Vice-President,
Frans	Timmermans,	described	the	judiciary	reform	as	a	“serious	attack	on	the	rule	of	law”,	indicating	that	the
Commission	was	planning	infringement	proceedings	if	the	draft	law	was	adopted.	He	also	said	that	the
Commission	was	considering	invoking	the	EU’s	highest	possible	political	sanctions,	never	used	before	–	the
proceedings	under	article	7	of	the	EU	Treaty,	which	could	lead	to	the	suspension	of	Poland’s	voting	rights.
V4’s	reaction	to	these	EU-Polish	tensions	has	exposed	a	major	split	in	the	alliance.	While	senior	Czech	judges
denounced	the	judicial	reforms	as	an	attack	on	the	rule	of	law,	Hungary	(which	has	just	begun	a	year-long
presidency	of	the	Visegrad	Group	and	which	has	been	similarly	criticised	for	its	reforms	tightening	political	control
over	courts,	media	and	civil	society	groups)	unambiguously	took	Poland’s	side.	Hungarian	Prime	Minister	Viktor
Orbán	accused	the	European	Commission	of	overstepping	its	authority	and	denounced	Timmerman’s	intention	as
an	“inquisition”.	Poland	was	given	a	week	by	the	European	Commission	to	halt	its	judicial	reforms:	Duda	has	said
he	will	veto	the	bill.
It	was	extremely	uncertain	how	many	EU	members	would	have	supported	the	EU	sanctions.	Amidst	all	the
uncertainty,	one	thing	seems	to	be	clear:	deploying	the	Article	7	mechanism	–	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	EU’s
“nuclear	option”	–	would	have	triggered	an	unprecedented	crisis	within	the	EU,	with	grave	implications	for	all
three	dimensions	of	its	governance	–	polity,	policy	and	politics.
The	process	of	disentangling	the	UK	from	the	EU	will	undoubtedly	be	lengthy,	complex	and	complicated.	Yet	it
might	also	provide	plenty	of	opportunities	to	enhance	the	V4’s	role	and	status	within	the	EU.	If	the	group	comes
up	with	a	proactive	and	positive	approach	towards	the	Brexit	process,	it	may	be	able	to	make	a	substantial
impact	not	only	on	the	UK-EU	negotiations	but	also	the	European	Union’s	post-Brexit	future.	Whether	the
Visegrad	Group	will	be	ready,	willing,	and	able	to	fully	exploit	these	opportunities	is	unclear.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Dr	Monika	Brusenbauch	Meislová	is	a	lecturer	and	researcher	based	at	the	Department	of	Politics	and	European
Studies	at	Palacký	University	Olomouc	in	the	Czech	Republic.	Her	long-term	research	interests	include	British
and	Czech	foreign	policies,	including	UK-EU	relations	and	Czech-British	relations.
What	the	Czech	Republic	wants	to	get	out	of	Brexit	negotiations
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